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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In his autobiography, John Stuart Mill states that On
Liberty was likely to survive longer than anything else he
had written.

1

From the vantage point of the present, it

would seem that Mill was correct in his estimation of the
future of his essay.

It is safe to say that On Liberty is

Mill's most famous work.

However, there does not seem to

be a concensus among scholars about the ultimate basis for
Mill's defense of freedom in: On: Liberty.

There are those

who contend that the ultimate basis for Mill's argument in
On Liberty is his concern for self-development or individuality.

,

Then, there are those who argue that what Mill

presents in: On: Liberty is really a defense of individuality
and freedom based on Mill's version of utilitarianism.
This difference of opinion has its basis in a paradox.
This paradox is based on what appears to be Mill's commitment to two seemingly inconsistent principles.

At times one

is led to believe that thP. highest and controlling principle
for Mill is found in utilitarianism.

At other times, however,

1
John Stuart Mill, Autobiography of John Stuart Mill
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 177.
1

2

one feels that the ultimate end for Mill is self-development.
What I hope to do in this thesis is to examine this
paradox and some possible solutions to it.
present some conclusions upon this issue.

Finally, I shall

CHAPTER II
MILL'S UTILITARIANISM
Mill explicitly professed his commitment to utilitarianism as his highest and controlling principle throughout
his life.

In his autobiography, which was written after On

Liberty, Mill expresses his commitment to utilitarianism:
"I never, indeed, waivered in the conviction that happiness
2
is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life."
Indeed, in On Liberty itself, Mill expresses his allegiance
to utilitarianism:
It is proper to state that I forgo any advantage
which could be derived to my argument from the idea
of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility.
I regard ujility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical
questions.
Mill presents the principles of his notions about
social utility in Utilitarianism:
The creed which accepts as the foundation of
morals "utility" or the "greatest happiness principle" holds that actions are right in proportion
as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they
tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By
happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of
pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of
pleasure . . . namely, that pleasure and freedom
2 Ibid. , p. 100.
3John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York:
Century-Crofts, 1947), p. 10.
3

Appleton-

4
from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and
that all desirable things (which are as numerous in
the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable
either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as
means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention
of pain. 4
Mill points out that the true utilitarian standard is
not so much concerned for the individual's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest
5
number.
Up to this point, Mill's views on utilitarianism are
not unlike those of his father, James Mill, and Jeremy Bentham.

However, as one reads on in Utilitarianism, one

begins to realize how different John Stuart Mill's notions
about the utility principle are from those of his father and
Bentham.

Bentham only recognized quantitative differences

between pleasures based on such factors as intensity and
duration.

John Stuart Mill, however, speaks of qualitative

differences between pleasures.

To determine what makes one

pleasure of a greater quality and value than another, Mill
says:

"Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or

almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to
4

lis:

Idem, Utilitarianism, ed. by Oskar Piest (IndianapoThe Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 10-11.
5Ibid., pp. 15-16.

5

prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure."

6

Mill then

states that those who are equally acquainted with and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both do give a
decided preference to the manner of existence which employs
7
their higher faculties.
Mill seems to have a special regard for those capable of experiencing the nhigher pleasures."
'It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied.n

8

In the last chapter of Utilitarianism, Mill expresses
the view which he lays out also in his Autobiography and his
Essay On Bentham, that it is not inconsistent with the principles of utility to seek an end other than happiness.

Mill

makes clear, however, that all ends desired for themselves
are ultimately desired only because of their connection to
happiness.

So ultimately it is still happiness which is
9
desired as the highest end.
6

rbid., p. 12.

7 rbid., p. 12.
8rbid. , p. 14.
9 rbid., pp. 48-49.

CHAPTER III
PARADOX OF ON LIBERTY--INDIVIDUALITY OR UTILITY?
With this background of Mill's version of utilitarianism, we can now examine the question of whether, in On
Liberty, Mill abandons his commitment to utilitarianism
and sets up the development of individuality as his highest
and controlling principle.

To begin with, I think it is

important to note that Mill's concern for individuality and
freedom is not to be found only in On Liher·ty.

In his

Principles of Political Economy, for example, Mill shows
a concern for the free development of individuality.

Mill

in the Principles of Political Economy discusses the relative value of a free enterprise economic system.

Much of

the discussion seems strongly reminiscent of that expressed
in On Liberty.
. . . We are too ignorant either of what individual
agency in its best form, or Socialism in its best
form, can accomplish, to be qualified to decide
which of the two will be the ultimate form of human
society.
If a conjecture may be hazarded, the decision
will probably depend mainly on one consideration,
viz. which of the two systems is consistent with
the greatest amount of human liberty and spontaneity. After the means of subsistence are assured,
the next in strength of the personal wants of human
beings is liberty; and (unlike the physical wants,
which as civilization advances become more moderate
and more amenable to control) it increases instead
of diminishing in intensity as the intelligence and
6

7
the moral faculties are more developed. The perfection both of social arrangements and of practical
morality would be, to secure to all persons complete
independence and freedom of action, subject to no
restriction but that of not doing injury to others:
and the education which taught or the social institutions which required them to exchange the control
of their own actions for any amount of comfort or
affluence, or to renounce liberty for the sake of
equality, would deprive them of one of the most
elevated characteristics of human nature.lO
It is in On Liberty where Mill presents his most developed argument concerning the development of individuality.
A strong motivation behind Mill's defense of the free development of individuality was his fear of the dangers connected
with the recent use of democracy in the world.

In a section

of his autobiography dealing with On Liberty, Mill states
that this essay expressed fears that the growth of social
equality and of the government of public opinion might impose on mankind an oppressive yoke of uniformity in opinion
.
11
and pract1.ce.
Next to On Liberty, this sentiment of Mill's is probably most clearly presented in his essay on Tocqueville's
Democracy In America.

In this essay, Mill discusses the

tendency of democracy towards bearing down on individuality,
10

John Stuart Mill, "Selections From Principles Of
Political Economy," Limits Of Liberty, ed. Peter Radcliff
(Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), p. 64.
11
Idem, Autobiography of John Stuart Mill, pp. 177-178.

8

and circumscribing the exercise of the human faculties with. narrow 1'1m1ts.
.
12
1n

Mill says that there must be steps

taken to prevent this:
To sustain the higher pursuits of philosophy
and art; to vindicate and protect the unfettered
exercise of reason, and the moral freedom of the
individual--these are purposes, to which, under a
Democracy, the superior spirits, and the government so far as it is permitted, should devote their
utmost energies.l3
As indicated earlier, it is in On Liberty where Mill
develops most fully his defense of individuality against the
potential tyranny of mass democratic society.

In the first

chapter of On Liberty, Mill states the object of the essay:
The object of this Essay is to assert one very
simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely
the dealings of society with the individual in the
way of compulsion and control, whether the means
used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That
principle is, that the sole end for which mankind
are warranted individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of arzion of any of
their number, is self-protection.

1 2 Idem, "M. De Tocqueville on Democracy In America,"
in The Philoso h of John Stuart Mill: Ethical, Political
and Religious, ed. Marshal Cohen New Yor : The Modern
Library, 1961), p. 168
13Ibid., pp. 168, 169.
14Idem, On Liberty, p. 9.

9

Now, of course, the question arises about the basis
for this principle.

Why does Mill assert the liberty of the

individual against societal coercion?

If Mill's argument in

On Liberty is to be considered consistent, I believe there
are only two possible responses.
obvious.

One response is rather

If Mill is a utilitarian, as he professes to be,

then it can be argued that individual freedom and the selfdevelopment that can derive from such freedom is defended
because it will in some way promote happiness.

The other

response is that in On Liberty Mill abandons his commitment
to utilitarianism and instead sets up the development of
individuality as his highest and controlling principle.
Individuality is valued for itself.
There are several sources that one can go to which
would seem to support the first response, that Mill's argument in On Liberty is based on utilitarian principles.
Indeed, in On Liberty itself Mill seems to indicate that
the basis of his argument in the essay is founded in the
principles of utility:
It is proper to state that I forgo any advantage
which could be derived to my argument from the idea of
abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I
regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical
questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize
the subjection of individual spontaneity to external
control, only in respect to those actions of each,
which concern the interest of other people. 5

15

.

Ib~d.,

pp. 10, 11.

10
Ostensibly, Mill never abandoned his allegiance to
utilitarianism.

The fact that Mill affirmed his allegiance

to utilitarianism in works written after On Liberty weighs
against the argument of those who contend that in On Liberty
Mill abandons his commitment to utilitarianism and sets up
self-development as his highest and controlling principle.
For example, as already indicated, in his autobiography,
which was written after On Liberty, Mill affirmed his commit.
.
16 Indeed, Utilitarianism, the book
ment to ut~"1"~tar~an~sm.
in which Mill explains his version of social utility, was
written after On Liberty.
Not surprisingly, then, there are scholars like Alburey
Castell who maintain that Mill's argument in On Liberty is
based on utilitarianism.

Castell states that liberty is
.
. 1 ut~"1"~ty. 17 speak"~ng
d e f en d e d on t h e groun d s o f lts
soc~a

of On Liberty, Castell says:
It contains a defense of the individual's right to
think and act for himself. It says, by way of premise, that all human action should aim at creating,
maintaining, and increasing the greatest happiness
of the greatest number of people. Actions are right
when they do that; wrong when they do not. A good
society is one in which the greatest possible number
of persons enjoy the greatest possible amount of
16 Idem, Autobiography of John Stuart Mill, p. 100.
l7Alburey Castell, Introduction to On Liberty by
John Stuart Mill (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947),
p. viii.
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happiness. It says, secondly, that one of the most
important ways for society to ensure that its members
will be able to contribute their maximum to creating,
preserving, and increasing the greatest happiness of
the greatest number is to ext!Yd them the right to
think and act for themselves.
Castell's analysis seems quite reasonable if one assumes that in On Liberty Mill does not deviate from his
commitment to happiness as the highest good.

Indeed, one

can point to numerous examples in On Liberty where Mill's
argument is based on utility.

His stance in chapter two in

favor of freedom of opinion and freedom of expression seems
to be based more upon the usefulness to society of permitting such freedom rather than on any intrinsic value to
such freedom.

Indeed, I do not think that it can be denied

that On Liberty is filled with examples of the utilitarian
value of the development of individuality.
However, there is a problem.

There are instances in

On Liberty where it would appear that happiness is not the
highest good.

At times, one gets the impression that for

Mill the highest good is self-development.

Individuality

seems to be valued for itself without any connection to
utility.
Mill seems more concerned about self-development than
happiness when he looks with favor upon this quote of
18

Ibid., p. vii.

12

Wilhelm von Humboldt:
"The end of man, or that which is prescribed by
the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not
suggested by vague and transient desires, is the
highest and most harmonious development of his powers
to a complete and consistent whole;" that, therefore,
the object "towards which every human being must
ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially
those who design to influence their fellow men must
ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power
and development"; that for this there are two requisites,
"freedom, and variety of situations"; and that from
the union of these arise "individual vigor and manifold
diversity," which combine themselves in "originality."! 9
The fact that Mill looks with approval upon the statement by Wilhelm von Humboldt is quite significant.

The chief

end for man described in this quote is self-development, not
social utility.
As indicated already, On Liberty is filled with passages
which seem to indicate that the highest and controlling principle for Mill is individuality and not utilitarianism.

Mill

decries the lack of high regard for individuality in society:
But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly
recognized by the common modes of thinking, as having
any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its
own account. The majority, being satisfied with the
ways of mankind as they now are (for it is they who
make them what they are), cannot comprehend why tho~O
ways should not be good enough for everybody; . . .
19

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, p. 57.

20 Ibid., p. 56.
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This statement by Mill is rather important.

He is

critical of the fact that the mass of men are satisfied
with a society in which there is an absence of individuality.
The only logical conclusion from this statement is that Mill
preferred individuality more than happiness.

Richard Licht-

man makes this observation about this statement by Mill:
Mill here makes the crucial admission that the
mass of mankind is satisfied with the human condition
as it now stands--that is, that their happiness is
apparently compatible with the absence of freedom.
The possibility of a conflict between happiness and
freedom has actually materialized. In the third
chapter, Mill is commending the doctrine of individual free devel2~ment against the mediocre satisfaction
of the masses.
Chapter four of On Liberty provides another example in
which Mill seems to value the free development of individuality over utilitarian concerns:
But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as
it may be called, constructive injury which a person
causes to society, by conduct which neither violates
any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself;
the inconvenience is one which society can afford to
bear~ for the sake of the greater good of human freedom. 2
It appears that what Mill is saying in this passage is that
the contentment of the mass of people in society is to be

21 Richard Lichtman, "The Surface and Substance of Mill's
Defense of Freedom," Social Research 30 (1963): 486.
22
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, p. 82.
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given less consideration than the freedom of the individual.
This is not a statement one would expect from a utilitarian.
Such a statement would be expected from one who sets up the
development of individuality as his highest and controlling
principle.
C. L. Ten, in an article entitled "Mill on Self-Regarding Actions," makes some similar observations.

Ten makes

reference to some of Mill's argument in chapter four of On
Liberty.

Ten points to the situation presented by Hill in

which the overwhelming majority in a society feel strongly
about the private conduct of a small group of people, and
demand that the latter be fined or imprisoned for a short
time.

Ten maintains that there would be a good utilitarian

reason for punishing that private conduct.

However, it is

this type of thing that Mill indicates in On Liberty that hewants ruled out.

In Mill's example in the fourth chapter of

the prohibition on the eating of pork and in other similar
examples, Mill indicates concern about how hopeless the case
for liberty would be if the majority's genuine feelings of
horror and repugnance are recognized as having a claim to
.
.
23
ser1ous
cons1. d erat1on.

2 3c. L. Ten, "Mill on Self-Regarding Actions" in On
Liberty by John Stuart Mill, ed. David Spitz (New York:--W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1975), p. 244.

CHAPTER IV
THE PROBLEM OF SOLVING THE PARADOX
There is a problem then.

Mill professes to be a util-

itarian, yet certain passages in On Liberty seem to indicate
that he has abandoned his commitment to happiness as the
greatest good and sets up self-development in its place.
Mill seems at times to value individuality for itself with
no connection to happiness.

There is a paradox.

Numerous

scholars have presented interpretations of On Liberty which
would seemingly solve this dilemma.

As indicated earlier,

these scholars generally take one of two views.

Some say

that Mill's defense of individuality in On Liberty is based
on its utilitarian value.

Then, there are those who contend

that Mill's argument in On Liberty shows ultimately that
Mill's highest and controlling principle is self-development
and not utility.

Therefore, it is not inconsistent for Mill

to argue in On Liberty as if he valued individuality for itself because for Mill the highest good actually is selfdevelopment and not the greatest happiness for the greatest
number.

For reasons that shall become apparent, I reject

both views.

It is my contention that there is no valid way

to conclude that Mill is consistent in On Liberty.

To accept

this position, however, I think it is necessary to examine
the argument of some scholars on this issue.

15
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Robert Paul Wolff suggests a solution to the dilemma
that one is faced with in On Liberty.

Discussing Mill's

argument as it develops in On Liberty, Wolff says:
On some occasions, he seems to say that the free development of individual tastes and inclinations is a
valuable means to the end of happiness . . . . At
other times, his language suggests that individual
expression is itself a satisfying experience and
hence one of the ends of life, not merely a means
to some end. The truth, most probably, is that Mill
personally valued individuality for itself, but felt
it necess~ry to defend it to the world by a utilitarian
argument. 4
Wolff's proposition is very appealing.

It provides an

answer to the paradox that one faces in On Liberty.

Indeed,

there is one passage in chapter three which would seem to
verify Wolff's proposition:
Having said that Individuality is the same thing
with development, and that it is only the cultivation
of individuality which produces, or can produce, welldeveloped human beings, I might here close the argument: for what more or better can be said of any
condition of human affairs, than that it brings human
beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can
be? or what worse can be said of any obstruction to
good, than it prevents this? Doubtless, however,
these considerations will not suffice to convince
those who most need convincing; and it is necessary
further to show, that these developed human beings
are of some use to the undeveloped--to point out to
those who do not desire liberty and would not avail
themselves of it, that they may be in some intelligible
manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use
of it without hindrance.25
2 4Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1968), p. 26.
25
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, pp. 63, 64.
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The implications of this statement seem to support
Wolff's proposition.
itself.

Mill seems to value individuality for

However, to convince others of its value, he feels

he must show its utility.
Wolff's proposition provides an appealing solution to
the paradox that one faces in On Liberty.

Mill is really

not inconsistent when he writes as if individuality is the
highest good and an end in itself, while at the same time
professing that he is a utilitarian because he feels the
need to show the utilitarian value of individuality to the
mass of men.
I, however, cannot accept this position.

In a way,

what Wolff has done is to turn the tables on the argument.
Utility is now used as a means to support the end of individuality.

I do not believe that it is valid to say that Mill

ultimately valued utilitarianism merely as a means.

This is

in direct opposition to what Mill has explicitly said about
utilitarianism.

Indeed, in On Liberty itself and in books

written after it, Mill has made quite clear his commitment
to utility as the highest good and the end of life.

Before

I could accept the proposition presented by Wolff, I would
have to have an explanation of why, if Mill really considered utility as a means to support individuality, would he
make it quite clear in both Utilitarianism and in his autobiography that he considered utility as the chief end

18
in life.

An explanation concerning this is particularly

relevant considering that both books were written after On
Liberty, the book upon which Wolff bases his proposition.
I do not believe that it is really possible for Wolff to
come up with an explanation.

I think that Mill makes it

particularly clear in his autobiography about his commitment to utilitarianism.
which he had to face.

Mill talks of the mental crisis
Mill states that he resolved the

crisis still committed to the principle that he was always
committed to, which is, of course,

~tility. 26

Robert Ladenson presents quite a different proposition
than does Wolff.

Ladenson argues that Mill does not deviate

in his allegiance to utilitarianism in On Liberty.

Laden-

son's argument is worthy of study because, like Wolff's
proposition, it presents an appealing answer to the contradictions that one is faced with in On Liberty.

Speaking of

Mill's contentions in On Liberty, Ladenson says:
. . . we have a sophisticated, yet unmistakeably,
utilitarian argument for the desirability of cultivating individuality, and derivatively for liberty
of action. To asseflble all the premises:
(1)

26

To cultivate individuality is to develop
certain qualities, for example, observation,
judgment, discrimination, firmness of will,
and so on, that are the distinctive endowment of a human being.

Idem, Autobiography of John Stuart Mill, p. 100

19
(2)

Such qualities are instrumental in discerning
or desiring what is best, and thus, in the
proportion to which people have them they
become more valuable to themselves and are
therefore capable of being more valuable
to others.

(3)

For a utilitarian (a) "what is best" is what
is most productive of happiness, and (b) something is valuable to the extent that it is
productive of happiness.

(4)

Accordingly, such qualities are abilities
and capacities which, far more than any
other aspect of human individuals, enable
them to promote both their own happiness
and the happiness of others.

Therefore,
(5)

Individuality ought to be cultivated.

In light of the foregoing, the defense of liberty of
action in chapter three is likewise utilitarian in
character, namely,
(6)

Liberty of action is necessary for the cultivation of individuality.

(7)

From a utilitarian standpoint, the cultivation
of individuality is highly desirable.

Therefore,
(8)

There ought to be liberty of action.

27

Ladenson's argument, like Wolff's, presents a solution
to the paradox.

Essentially what Ladenson is saying is that

Mill supports individuality because it promotes the utilitarian goal of happiness.

Individuality is simply a means to

27Robert F. Ladenson, "Hill's Conception of Individuality," Social Theory an:d Practice 4 (1977): 175.

20

the end of happiness.

This kind of reasoning leads one to

the conclusion that there is no inconsis.tency in On Liberty.
It is natural for Mill, a professed utilitarian, to defend
self-development because it promotes happiness.
I, however, do not accept Ladenson's argument.

Laden-

son maintains that, for Mill, individuality serves as a
means for the utilitarian end.

This, however, is not con-

sistent with some things that Mill says in On Liberty.

As

indicated earlier, there are some passages in which Mill
seems to value individuality not as a means to some higher
end, but an end in itself.

Those passages make it appear

that the highest and controlling principle for Mill is selfdevelopment and not utilitarianism.

As I said before, there

are passages which indicate that Mill gives preference to
the free development of individuality over the satisfaction
of the masses.

Finally, there is that one passage in chapter

three of On Liberty which I quoted in my discussion of Wolff's
argument, which seems to indicate that Mill presents the
utility of individuality as a means to get the mass of mankind to accept the end of self-development.

I do not think

it can be said that Ladenson's argument offers a viable solution to the paradox.
Maurice Cowling, in his book Mill and Liberalism,
argues that, for Mill, the development of individuality

21
serves the end of utility.

Cowling's argument in support of

this conclusion is rather complicated.

Cowling's interpre-

tation of what Mill means by happiness is rather crucial to
his argument.

From this interpretation, Cowling builds his

argument that individuality is essentially a means for the
end of utility.
Cowling maintains that when Mill speaks of happiness,
he is not referring to any happiness which the individual
might happen to desire.

Cowling contends that when Mill

speaks of happiness, he means the happiness that rational
reflection would approve.
.
28
elevated sense.

·Happiness is referred to in an

This notion of elevated happiness that Cowling discusses can be easily related to some of Mill's discussion
in Utilitarianism.

As noted earlier, Mill argues in Utili-

tarianism that it is compatible with the principle of utility to recognize a qualitative distinction among pleasures
as well as a quantitative distinction.

There are "higher

pleasures."

Those pleasures which employ the higher faculties and pleasures of the intellect are of higher value. 29

28Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp, 31,32.
29John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 11,12.
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Cowling in his book argues that Mill defends the free
development of individuality in On Liberty because it serves
as a means to achieving the elevated or higher pleasures:
The demand for liberty is not the assertion of a
fundamentally binding end, but the designation of
a means to the end--the end of allowing men to
approach as close as possible to that highest of
all pleasures which comes from mental cultivation
of the closest approximation possible to knowledge
of what is true.30
Cowling makes it quite clear in the fifth chapter of
his book that the free development of"individuality serves
the utilitarian end of "higher happiness."
General utility for Mill means, as we know,
maximization; not of any happiness, but of the
higher happiness, the freedom of men to engage
in rational pursuit of disinterestedness and
truth. Maximization of the higher happiness
comes when men are left free (from mediocre social
pressure) to reflect on, and choose, the right
action rather than the wrong one.31
I think it is necessary at this point to be quite clear
about Cowling's understanding of Mill's utilitarian end.

The

end, of course, is the elevated pleasure derived from rational pursuit.

It is important to note that this notion of

rational pursuit is not without bounds.

3°cowling, p. 42.
31Ibid., pp. 101, 102.

Something more

23
specific is intended here:
Mill, then, is offering persuasion, not to a
vulgarly libertarian position, but to a unitary
ethic, based on a unitary noetic, which assumes
neither that methods of right reasoning are various
and diverse, nor that there will be ultimate divergence about its injunctions. It assumes, on the
contrary, that, given liberty to reflect and freedom from pressure of mediocrity, the higher minds
will use their liberty (and the lower minds, perhaps, even theirs) to play their part in establishing a disinterestedly utilitarian ethic which
will have been validated by agreed philosophical
procedures . . . . Mill assumes that, given as
wide a freedom as possible to exercise rational
choice and taking this freedom as the means, the
end will be achieved, not of diversity of opinion
pure and simple, but diversity of opinion within
the limits of a rationally homogenous, agreed,
social concensus about the meth~2 of judging and
the right end to be approached.
Cowling connects Mill's utilitarian end with the development of a rational concensus in society.

Liberty and

individuality are not valued for themselves, but because
they provide a situation in which a rational concensus for
.
33
society can be developed by the el~te.
The best way of achieving a rational concensus,
in other words, is to leave men as free as ~ossible
to be led into it by a rational education. 3 ·
32 rbid., pp. 43, 44.
33
rbid., pp. 103-105.
34rbid. • p. 103.
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Cowling states that Mill defends the freedom to develop individuality, where no assignable damage is done to others by
the use of that freedom, because then the only way to maximize utility is to leave men's minds absolutely open to the
working of rational education.

It is only through rational

education that unforced assent to the right means of deter35
mining the right course of action will take root.
According to Cowling, those of genius quality or the
elite play a key role in the development of the rational
concensus that he talks about.

Considerations about the

elite are of great importance to Mill's argument in On Liberty.

Cowling implies, in fact, that Mill's defense of the

free development of individuality is tied to the fate of the
elite:
But Mill was attempting in On Liberty to protect
the elite from domination by mediocrity. How he
would have applied his principles in a system where
the elite had triumphed, and to what extent it
could have operated individualistically where a
rational concensus had prevailed, is another question. On Libert!, in the form in which it was
written, so farrom being an attempt to free men
from the impositions of all doctrine, is an attempt
to free them from customary, habitual, conventional
doctrine. Convention, custom and the mediocrity of
opinion are the enemies in Mill's mythology: the
freedom he gives is given in order to subject men's
prejudices to reasoning authority. On Liberty does
not offer safeguards for individuality; it is designed to propagate the individuality of the elevated
by protecting them against the mediocrity of opinion
35

rbid., p. 103.
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as a whole . . . the purpose in allowing men liberty,
the justification of individuality, is not diversity
in itself, but diversity informed by the rationally
agreed education the clerisy alone can provide. Education is desirable and self-development an obligation, because both maximize the same part of happiness.
Mill, in short, feared democracy and loved individuality, not so much_ because individuality would induce
diversity, but because, by breaking up existing rigidities, it would make the world safe for "rational"
education, "rational" thinkine and the assured leadership of the "rational clerisy."36
Cowling's argument presents the possibility of another
interesting solution to the paradox that one is faced with
in On Liberty.

Cowling associates Mill's "higher pleasures"

with the pursuit of the rational concensus.

Therefore it

could be argued that Mill's defense of individuality in On
Liberty is not inconsistent with Hill's commitment to utilitarianism.

It is by the free development of individuality

that man can develop rational pursuit.

I, however, reject

the solution which develops out of Cowling's argument.
Cowling's argument still restricts individuality to a
means which serves the utilitarian end.

As indicated already,

this is inconsistent with parts of On Liberty in which it
&ppears that Mill views self-development as an end in itself
and his highest and controlling principle.
Cowling's argument could develop into a proposition
such as the following:
36

Ib1."d.., pp • 104

It is not inconsistent for Mill, a

I

105

•
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professed utilitarian, to defend individuality as if it
were a good in itself because the higher pleasures can be
equated with the pursuit of rationality which implies selfdevelopment.
tion.

I have serious problems with such a proposi-

In Hill's revised definition of utilitarianism,

happiness is still the end.

Mill state.s that what he means

by happiness is pleasure and the absence of pain.

Pleasure

and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as
37
ends.
To be consistent, then, with Hill's argument in
Utilitarianism, it would have to be maintained that Mill
values self-development because of its connection to pleasure.
Man may experience a "higher pleasure" or a more valuable
pleasure from "the manner of existence which employs their
38
higher faculties."
However, what is still desired as an
end is pleasure, not the use of the higher faculties or selfdevelopment.

The "higher pleasures" are sought after because

they provide pleasure, not because they are "higher pleasures."
Therefore, the proposition that I presented is fallacious.
Mill's notions about utilitarianism are inconsistent with
parts of Or, Liberty in which he indicates that self-development is the highest good and an end in itself.
37 "11
.
.
M1. , Ut1."1"1.tar1.an1.sm,
p. 10.
38
Ibid. , p. 12.

For Mill to
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remain consistent with his definition of utilitarianism, the
only thing that could be considered an end in itself is
pleasure or happiness.

However, as shown earlier, there are

sections in On Liberty where Mill indicates that he would
sacrifice the pleasure or happiness of the many to preserve
the individuality of the few.

This is certainly not consis-

tent for even Mill's revised utilitarianism.
Cowling's discussion concerning the importance of the
elite in On Liberty is a crucial part of his argument.

Mill

defends the free development of individuality because he
desires to protect the elite from domination by mediocrity.
A rational concensus can then be developed under the leadership of the elite.

This result serves utility.

individuality is reduced to a means.

Once again,

Cowling, in fact,

voices uncertainty about Mill's concern for the free development of individuality in a society where the elite has
triumphed.
From this reasoning it can be concluded that it is not
inconsistent with utilitarianism for Mill to defend individuality as he did in On Liberty.

In a society where individ-

uality is protected, there is then provided a situation in
which the elite are free to attempt to lead the way to a
rational concensus which serves utility.
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Once again, I must say that I reject this solution to
the paradox that one faces in On Liberty.

It cannot be

denied, however, that Mill places great value upon those
talented few of genius quality.
the salt of the earth.

He refers to these few as

He states that without them, human

life would become a stagnant pool.

Genius, however, can
39
only exist in an atmosphere of freedom.
In one passage particularly, Mill emphasizes the importance to society of a talented elite:
No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy,
either in its political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or
could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the
sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in
their best times they always have done) by the counsels
and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed
One or Few. The initiation of all wise or noble things,
comes and must come from individuals; generally at
first from some one individual. The honor and glory
of the average man is that he is capable of following
that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise
and nzsle things, and be led to them with his eyes
open.
It cannot be denied then that Mill places great value
on a talented elite.

However, it cannot be said that Mill

defends self-development simply because it creates a situation in which the elite will be free to develop a rational
39

Idem, On Liberty, p. 64.

40 Ibid., p. 66.
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concensus in society and therefore serve utility.

Too many

parts of On Liberty are inconsistent with this conclusion.
Those passages in On Liberty in which it seems that Mill
considers self-development an end in itself and the highest
good would appear to invalidate Cowling's conclusion that
Mill defends individuality to protect the elite from domination.

There are instances where Mill defends individuality

as a good in itself with no apparent connection to the talented elite.
There is one passage in On Liberty in which it is
indicated that Mill values self-development as his highest
end.

However, to protect free self-development, Mill indi-

cates that he feels the need to show to the mass of mankind
the utility of individuality.

This passage was quoted dur-

ing my discussion of Wolff's argument.

What is important is

that immediately after this passage Mill presents his discussion about the value of a talented elite for society.

This

certainly would seem to show that Mill values individuality
irregardless of its connection to the elite.
Some of Mill's argument in chapter two of On Liberty
I think creates some serious doubts about Cowling's position
that Mill values liberty and individuality not for themselves
but because they provide a situation in which a rational concensus can be developed by the elite.

Mill, in chapter two.
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argues that liberty to dissent against the received opinion
41
is the whole truth.
This seems to indicate that Mill
would cherish individual liberty even if the elite were
successful and did lead society to some type of rational
concensus.
It would seem, then, that Cowling's argument does not
present a solution to the paradox.

I believe that I have

shown the invalidity of the proposition that Mill's concern
for individuality is based on its connection to the development of a rational concensus by the elite which serves the
utilitarian end.

What Cowling has presented does not con-

vince me that Mill's utilitarianism is not inconsistent with
some of his defense of self-development that he presents in
On Liberty.

41

Ibid., pp. 15-54.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
As I indicated early in my thesis, there are basically
only two ways in which Mill can be considered consistent in
his argument in On Liberty.

One way is to argue that Mill

supports individuality because it serves the utilitarian end
which he professes to be committed to.

The other way is to

maintain that in On Liberty, Mill abandons utilitarianism
and instead takes up self-development as an end in itself
and the highest good.

Neither side has proved its case; the

paradox still exists.
Wolff, Ladenson, and Cowling present, I believe, the
more plausible solutions to the paradox.

However, as indi-

cated, there are flaws in each argument.

Therefore, there

is only one conclusion that I think is valid.
Mill in On liberty is inconsistent.

It is, that

Parts of On Liberty are

inconsistent with Mill's professed utilitarianism.

However,

there is no indication that Mill abandoned his commitment to
utility.

In On Liberty itself and in books written after it,

Mill explicitly reaffirms his commitment to utilitarianism.
Mill appears to have allegiance to two inconsistent ends.
He does not appear to be settled on what is his highest and
controlling principle, self-development or utility.
31
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Any conclusion that Mill is not inconsistent in On
Liberty I am afraid is doomed to repudiation.

I do not

believe that there is basis in text for any other conclusion.
I believe my handling of the sophisticated arguments of
Wolff, Ladenson, and Cowling supports this.
I have found nothing written by Mill which solves the
paradox.

Mill makes statements in Utilitarianism, in his

autobiography, and in his Essay on Bentham which indicate
that it is not inconsistent for a utilitarian to pursue an
end other than happiness for itself.

In fact, Mill indicates

that the only way to achieve happiness is not to seek it
directly.

However, Mill makes the point that in reality,

nothing is desired except happiness.

Mill states that what-

ever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond
itself is desired as itself as a part of happiness.
not desired for itself until it has become so.

It is

Those who

desire an end for its own sake desire it either because the
possession of it is a pleasure, or because the absence of it
42
is a pain.
In other words, the only thing ultimately desirable as an end is happiness.
The paradox that one is faced with in On Liberty, I
am afraid, is permanent.

Mill is inconsistent.

Any other

response I think would be conjecture and not based on text.
42

Idem, Utilitarianism, p. 48.
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